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THE LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF
OPERATION DESERT STORM
Robert Kogod Goldman*
In this article, the author describes the rules embodied in the Geneva
Conventions and the customary rules of war He focuses on the relation of
customary law to codifications such as the Geneva Conventions and their
First Additional Protocol. The author describes many of these rules in the
context of Operation Desert Storm during the 1991 Persian Gulf War
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE recently concluded hostilities between the allied coalition' and
Iraq were a classic example of an international, i.e., interstate, armed
conflict as defined in article 2 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.2 As
* Professor of Law and Louis C. James Scholar; Co-Director, Center For Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law, The Washington College of Law the American University
This article is largely based on Chapter I of MIDDLE EAST WATCH ComMITTEE, NEEDLESS
DEATHS IN THE GULF WAR: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES DURING THE AIR CAMPAIGN AND VIOLA-
TIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR (1991). I am indebted to Kenneth Roth, Jemera Rone and
Virginia Sherry, of Human Rights Watch, and Professor Hamilton DeSaussure for their
assistance and contributions to this article.
1. In addition to the United States, the allied coalition in Operation Desert Shield
and Operation Desert Storm was comprised of forces from Argentina, Australia, Bang-
ladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, The Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait), Honduras, Morocco, NATO members
(Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
and Spain), Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syria, and the Soviet Union. See
Who Are the Allies? L.A. Times, Feb. 1, 1991, at A23, col. 2.
The air war against Iraq was carried out by the following coalition members: Canada,
France, Great Britain, Italy the United States, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, United Arab
Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait.
2. Article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 states:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no
armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention,
the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations.
They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if
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such, the military operations conducted by all the warring parties in the
Gulf were governed by the Geneva Conventions, as well as by the
customary laws of war Because Iraq, as well as many of the key members
of the allied coalition, were not parties to the First Additional Protocol
to the Geneva Conventions, that instrument was not directly applicable
to the Gulf conflict as a matter of conventional law I This does not mean,
however, that the Protocol was irrelevant to the conduct of the war Since
many of the Protocol's provisions strengthen, clarify, or otherwise codify
pre-existing customary legal restraints on methods and means of combat,
these provisions constitute customary international law and, thus, are
directly binding on all nations and on their armed forces during international
conflicts regardless of ratification. 4
Despite its refusal to ratify Geneva Protocol I, the United States has
expressed its support for many rules in the Protocol and has declared
others to be customary law I Moreover, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air
Force manuals on international law applicable during armed conflict
include prescriptions which often track the terminology of Geneva Protocol
I.
the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 comprise:
The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362,
75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3217 T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, T.I.A.S. No.
3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].
3. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977
Annex I, II, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I]. This instrument, which
supplements the four 1949 Geneva Conventions as to the protection of war victims,
codifies and updates legal restraints on means and methods of warfare to provide more
effective protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities in interna-
tional armed conflicts. Its elaboration was stimulated largely by a shared perception of
an increased danger to the civilian population because of air warfare and modern weaponry
4. See RESTATEMENT (TImtn) OF THE FOREIoN RELAT ONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
Introductory Note & §§ 101-103 (1987).
5. See Dupuis, Heywood & Sarko, The United States Position on the Relation of
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions-Remarks of Michael J. Matheson, 2 Am. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419 (1987)
(Remarks of Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State,
delivered on Jan. 22, 1987 at the 6th Annual American Red Cross-Washington College
of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary
International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions)
[hereinafter Matheson].
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This article sets forth, albeit not exhaustively," the basic legal rules and
principles governing the conduct of aerial bombardment 7 by belligerent
forces during the Gulf War The focus is, in particular, on customary
restraints on methods and means of warfare and the relation of customary
law to codifications of the laws of armed conflict in Geneva Protocol I.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
The law of armed conflict, or international humanitarian law, as stated
by a leading scholar in the field, "is the outgrowth of centuries of warfare
from which the rules and customs governing hostilities have developed." 8
Consequently, the law was largely shaped and crystallized before the
emergence of air power In fact, the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) and its
annexed regulations, 9 which codified the laws and customs of land warfare,
were elaborated at a time when the only method of dropping bombs from
the air was by balloon. Bombardment by aircraft, while dimly foreseen,
was "thought to be feasible only for the close support of ground forces-
a kind of supplement to artillery "10 Since combat was essentially limited
to the immediate zone where opposing land forces confronted each other,
the hinterlands of the belligerents "were believed to be secure from the
effects of hostilities."" Rapid technological advances in military air power
and modern weaponry and especially the devastating effects of strategic
aerial bombardment during World War II shattered any illusion about
the security of military targets and the civilian population that are located
far from areas of land combat. Although there is no comprehensive treaty
comparable to the 1907 Hague Regulations applicable to the conduct of
6. It does not discuss, for example, prohibitions on the use of chemical, biological
and other poisonous weapons, prohibitions against seizure or destruction of enemy
property or the special protections afforded to prisoner of war camps and to medical
units, hospitals and means of transport.
7 The term aerial bombardment includes, inter alia, "dropping munitions from
manned or unmanned aircraft, strafing, and using missiles or rockets against enemy targets
on land. UNtrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AnR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET No. 110-
31, INTERNATIONAL LAw-THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 5-1,
5-1 (1976) [hereinafter Am FORCE PAMPHLET]. The same rules discussed herein also
apply to Iraq's use of modified SCUD missiles to attack Israel and Saudi Arabia. For a
discussion of the legality of these attacks, see MIDDLE EAST WATCH COMMITTEE, NEEDLESS
DEATHS IN THE GULF WAR: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES DUmIN THE Am CAMPAIGN AND VIOLA-
TIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR 317-99 (1991).
8. Solf, Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary
International Law and Under Protocol I, I Am. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 117 117 (1986).
9 The Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, Oct. 18,
1907 36 Stat. 2277 T.S. 539, 99 U.N.T.S. 149; Regulations Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague
Regulations]. The United States is a party to this Convention which, together with its
annexed Regulations, remains the most authoritative source of law for the United States
in the conduct of actual military operations.
10. Solf, supra note 8, at 126.
11. Id.
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air warfare, aerial bombardment is, like all other forms of combat,
governed by certain legal rules which "must be derived from general
principles, extrapolated from the law affecting land or sea warfare, or
derived from other sources including the practice of states reflected in a
variety of sources."' 12
III. MILITARY NECESSITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF HuMANiTY
Customary legal restraints on warfare are premised on the notion that
"violence and destruction which are superfluous to actual military necessity
are not only immoral and wasteful of scarce resources, but also
counterproductive to attaining the political objectives for which military
force is employed."' 3 The Air Force Pamphlet defines military necessity
as "the principle which justifies measures of regulated force not forbidden
by international law which are indispensable for securing the prompt
submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of economic
and human resources.'4 It notes that this concept embraces the following
four basic elements:
(i) that the force used is capable of being and is in fact regulated by the
user; (ii) that the use of force is necessary to achieve as quickly as possible
the partial or complete submission of the adversary; (iii) that the force used
is no greater in effect on the enemy's personnel and property than needed
to achieve his prompt submission (economy of force); and (iv) that the force
used is not otherwise prohibited.' 5
Accordingly, the conduct of hostilities by belligerents "must be carried
on within the limits of the prohibitions of international law, including the
restraints inherent in the principle of 'necessity "'116
The principle of humanity both complements and inherently limits the
doctrine of military necessity The Air Force Pamphlet states that this
principle
forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary
[or proportionate] for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.
The principle of humanity results in a specific prohibition against unnecessary
suffering, a requirement of proportionality and confirms the basic
immunity of civilian populations and civilians from being objects of attack
during armed conflicts. 7
12. AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 7 at 1-7 1-3(c).
13. Solf, supra note 8, at 117
14. Am FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 7 at 1-5, i-3(a)(1).
15. Id. at 1-6, l-3(a)(1).
16. Id.
17 Id. at 1-6, 1-3(a)(2).
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IV UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2444
The duty to distinguish and to refrain from attacking the civilian
population was reiterated in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2 4 4 4,11
adopted by unanimous vote on December 18, 1969 The Resolution states
in pertinent part:
1 [T~he right of Parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy
is not unlimited;
2 [I]t is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such;
3 [A] distinction must be made at all times between persons taking an active
part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect
that the later be spared as much as possible.' 9
The U.S. government has expressly recognized this Resolution as
declarative of existing customary international law 20 These principles
govern the conduct of hostilities, including aerial bombardment, by all
armed forces, including the U.S. military
V CUSTOMARY LAW AND GENEVA PROTOCOL I. CIVILIAN IMMUNITY AND
THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION
Geneva Protocol I contains detailed rules, mostly reaffirmations or
clarifications of existing customary law, which implement the customary
principles that a distinction should be made between combatants and
civilians and that civilians and civilian objects may not be the targets of
attacks. Four different sections of the Protocol are devoted to this task.
First are provisions strengthening the legal requirement to distinguish
military objectives from civilians and civilian objects and to limit attacks
to military objectives. Second are provisions clarifying practical steps to
be taken in the selection of targets to prevent attacks on civilians and
civilian objects, including the rule of proportionality and a prohibition of
indiscriminate attacks. Third are provisions regulating the means and
methods of both attack and defense to avoid or minimize civilian casualties
and damage to civilian objects. Fourth are specific provisions limiting or
prohibiting attacks on particular objects and specified areas.
VI. GENERAL RESTRICTIONS ON AIR WARFARE
A. The Basic Rule: The Immunity of Civilians and Civilian Objects
Article 48 of Geneva Protocol I is a paraphrase of the basic rules stated
in paragraphs 2 and 3 of UNGA Resolution 2444. It states that "[i]n
18. Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 2444, 23 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 18) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7433 (1968).
19. Id.
20. See Rovine, Contemporary Practice of United States Relating to International
Law, 67 Am. J. INT'L L. 118, 122-26 (1973) (Letter from the General Counsel, United
States Department of Defense, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy dated Sept. 22, 1968).
Winter 19921
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order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations
only against military objectives."'2 The Air Force Pamphlet's formulation
of this basic principle is substantially similar It states that "[tihe
requirement to distinguish between combatants and civilians, and between
military objectives and civilian objects, imposes obligations on all the
parties to the conflict to establish and maintain the distinctions." 22
Artlcle 51(2) reaffirms this mandatory distinction by providing that
"[t]he civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not
be the object of attack. ' 23 This general immunity does not prohibit attacks
which may cause civilian casualties. For example, civilians forfeit their
protection against attack when they directly participate in hostilities -
which means taking part in an attack intended to physically harm enemy
personnel or objects. Also, civilians who are located within or near
legitimate military targets, while still immune from individualized attack,
assume the risk of death or injury as a result of direct attacks against
such targets, although as noted below, such civilians, nonetheless, would
retain the benefits of the rule of proportionality as it applies to collateral
civilian casualties.
B. Terror and Morale Attacks
Article 51(2) also prohibits attacks, and threats of such acts, which are
launched or threatened with intent to terrorize the civilian population.
Specifically, the second sentence of that section provides: "Acts or threats
of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the
civilian population are prohibited. ' 24 This provision is intended to make
clear that terror bombing violates the laws of war However, the fact that
attacks upon legitimate military objectives may cause terror among the
civilian population does not make such attacks unlawful.
Article 51 also prohibits bombing to attack civilian morale. Although
technically there may be a distinction between morale and terror bombing,
they are, in practice, treated the same. It has often been observed that
what is morale bombing to the attacking force is terror bombing to the
civilians who are targeted. In the past, these attacks were carried out by
strategic aerial bombardment of the enemy's economic infrastructure. This
infrastructure may include a mix of military and civilian targets. To the
extent that these attacks are launched or threatened solely or primarily
for political ends, they violate the principles of civilian immunity,
proportionality, and humanity Attacks intended primarily to induce the
21. Geneva Protocol i, supra note 3, art. 48.
22. AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 7 at 5-8, 5-3(a)(2)(b).
23. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(2).
24. Id.
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civilian population to rebel or to overthrow its leadership would be
examples of unlawful attacks .
2
C. Prohibited Uses of Civilians
The general protection of the civilian population against the effects of
attacks would be frustrated if the party in control of the population used
civilians to render certain areas immune from military operations.
Accordingly, article 51 protects civilians against such deliberate abuse by
prohibiting their use as shields for defensive positions, to hide military
objectives or to screen attacks. Nor may civilians be induced or compelled
to leave their homes or shelters to interfere with the movement of the
enemy 26 The Air Force Pamphlet notes that "[ai party to the conflict
which chooses to use its civilian population for military purposes violates
its obligations to protect its own civilian population. It cannot complain
when inevitable, although regrettable, civilian casualties result." 2 However,
as discussed later, such deliberate misuse of civilians to gain a military
advantage does not permit the attacking party to disregard customary
precautions, designed to avoid or minimize incidental civilian casualties.
The U.S. government has expressly recognized articles 48 and 51 as
customary international law,2" and the Air Force Pamphlet enjoins attacks
25. See DeSaussure, Commentator 31 AM. U.L. REV 883, 883-89 (1982) (Remarks
of Hamilton DeSaussure delivered at the American Red Cross-Washington College of Law
Conference on International Humanitarian Law); J. SPAIGHT, Ant POWER AD WAR
RIGHTS 275 (3d ed. 1947); J. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER IN THE CrrEs 110 (1930).
26. Article 51(7) provides:
The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not
be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular
in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede
military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the
civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military
objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.
Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(7).
One authoritative treatise on the Protocols states:
The paragraph reaffirms Art. 28 of the Fourth Convention which provides that "[T]he
presence of protected persons may not be used to render certain points or areas
immune from military operations," and it extends this provision by enlarging the
protected class to all civilians. It also incorporates the concept of movement to the
prohibition in order to cover cases in which civilian refugees are herded down a road
either as a shield for a moving column of combatants, or to impede the movement
of the adversary's columns.
M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH & W SOLF NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:
COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF
1949 316 (1982) [hereinafter NEW RULES].
During the Persian Gulf Conflict, Iraq used hostages as human shields of military
targets. See U.N. Accuses Iraq of Rights Abuses in Kuwait, Reuters, Feb. 4, 1992. This
was a clear breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Geneva Protocols.
27 Am FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 7 at 5-8, 1 5-3(b).
28. See Matheson, supra note 5, at 426.
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against civilians in terms virtually identical to article 51 29 The U.S.
government also regards other articles in Geneva Protocol I which are
designed to further clarify the requirement to distinguish between civilians
and military objectives as declaratory of customary law These articles,
among others, provide rather precise definitions of civilians, the civilian
population, military objectives, and civilian objects.
D. Civilians and Civilian Population
Article 50 of Geneva Protocol I defines the term "civilian population"
as comprising "all persons who are civilians" and defines a civilian as
anyone who is not a member of the armed forces or of an organized
armed group of a party to the conflict.3 0 Thus, civilians and the civilian
population comprise all persons who are not entitled to, or do not directly
participate in hostilities. This article also stipulates that the "presence
within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the
definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian
character "I' The point of this provision is that "[t]he presence of a small
number of off-duty combatants, or even of some engaged in the transaction
of business for the armed forces within a community of civilians would
not subject that community to attack. 3 2 Such a community, therefore,
is similarly immune from direct attack.
29. Am FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 7 at 5-7 5-3(a)(2)(b).
30. Article 50(i) defines a civilian as "any person who does not belong to one of the
categories referred to in article 4(A)(1), (2), (3), and (6) of the Third Convention and in
article 43 of this Protocol." Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 50(1). Article 4(A)(1),
(2), (3), and (6) of the Third Geneva Convention includes persons who are:
(1) members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces;
(2) members of other militias and members of volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating
in or outside their own territory even if this territory is occupied, provided that such
militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill
certain conditions;
(3) members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an
authority not recognized by the detaining power; and
(6) inhabitants of a nonoccupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to
form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect
the laws and customs of war.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2, art. 4(A)(1, 2, 3, & 6).
Article 43 of Geneva Protocol I, on the other hand, defines armed forces of a party
as consisting of "all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is
represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse party Such
armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system Geneva Protocol
I, supra note 3, art. 43.
31. Geneva Protocol 1, supra note 3, art. 50(3).
32. NEW RULES, supra note 26, at 296.
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E. Military Objectives
Both article 52(2) of Geneva Protocol I and the Air Force Pamphlet
employ the two-pronged test to define military objectives. This test limits
military objectives to those objects or targets which by their nature,
location, purpose, or use contribute effectively to the enemy's military
action and whose total or partial destruction, neutralization, or capture
offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the
time.3
The requirement that military objectives effectively contribute to military
action does not necessarily require a direct connection with combat
operations. As the Air Force Pamphlet states, "the inherent nature of the
object is not controlling since even a traditionally civilian object, such as
a civilian house, can be a military objective when it is occupied and used
by military forces in an armed engagement." '3 4 The military objective not
only must effectively contribute to the enemy's military action, but its
destruction, neutralization or capture must also offer a "definite military
advantage" to the attacking party in the "circumstances ruling at the
time." 5
The official International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC")
Commentary on Geneva Protocol 136 notes that the concept "definite
military advantage in circumstances ruling at the time" means it is not
"legitimate to launch an attack which only offers potential or indeterminate
advantages. Those ordering or executing the attack must have sufficient
information available to take this requirement into account; in case of
doubt, the safety of the civilian population, which is the aim of the
Protocol, must be taken into consideration. '3 7 The other authoritative
commentary, the New Rules, similarly indicates that the adjective "definite"
which modifies "military advantage is a word of limitation denoting
in this context a concrete and perceptible military advantage rather than
a hypothetical or speculative one."31 8 The requirement that the definite
military advantage must be present "in circumstances ruling at [the] time"
imposes an additional significant limitation on the attacker's target selection.
The New Rules states in this regard that "[tihis element emphasizes that
in the dynamic circumstances of armed conflict, objects which may have
been military objectives yesterday, may no longer be such today and vice
33. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 52(2); AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 7
at 5-8, 5-3(b)(1).
34. AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 7 at 5-9, 1 5-3(b)(2).
35. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 52(2); Am FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 7
at 5-8, 5-3(b)(1).
36. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (1987)
[hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY].
37 Id. at 636 (emphasis added).
38. NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 326.
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versa. Thus, timely and reliable information of the military situation is
an important element in the selection of targets for attack.
' 3 9
A leading humanitarian law scholar, who was present at the drafting
of Geneva Protocol I, endorses these interpretations by stating:
The "definite military advantage" required under the definition must be
present "in the circumstances ruling at the time." This element in the
definition effectively precludes military commanders from relying exclusively
on abstract categorizations in the determination of whether specific objects
constitute military objectives ("a bridge is a military objective; an object
located in the zone of combat is a military objective," etc.). Instead, they
will have to determine whether, say, the destruction of a particular bridge,
which would have been militarily important yesterday, does, in the circum-
stances ruling today, still offer a "definite military advantage" if not, the
bridge no longer constitutes a military objective and, thus, may not be
destroyed. 4
Whether the required definite military advantage under prevailing
circumstances would occur from a particular attack "must be judged in
the context of the military advantage anticipated from the specific military
operation of which the attack is a part considered as a whole, and not
only from isolated or particular parts of that operation.""
F Types of Military Objectives
Except for certain objects given special protection, Geneva Protocol I
does not delineate specific categories of persons or property that can be
considered legitimate military objectives. It is clear, however, that enemy
combatants and civilians who assume a combatant's role are legitimate
targets. The Air Force Pamphlet identifies undisputed military objectives
as the enemy's encampments and his armament, such as military aircraft,
tanks, anti-aircraft emplacements and troops in the field.42 The U.S.
Army's 43 and the U.S. Navy's" lists of military targets are similar,
although the Navy's is more expansive.
39. Id.
40. Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1974-1977 9 NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. 107 111 (1978).
41. NEW RULES, supra note 26, at 324-25.
42. AiR FoacE PAMPHLET, supra note 7 at 5-9 5-3(b)(2).
43. Army military objectives include, for example, factories producing munitions and
military supplies, military camps, warehouses storing munitions and military supplies,
ports and railroads being used for the transportation of military supplies, and other places
that are for the accommodation of troops or the support of military operations. UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL. THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 40 (c)
(1956) [hereinafter ARMY FIELD MANUAL].
44. Targets listed as proper for naval attack include:
enemy warships and military aircraft, naval and military auxiliaries, naval and military
bases ashore, warship construction and repair facilities, military depots and ware
[Vol. 23
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The ICRC Commentary contains the following proposed list of military
objectives:
(1) Armed forces and persons who take part in the fighting.
(2) Positions, installations or construction occupied by the forces as well
as combat objectives (that is to say, those objectives which are directly
contested in battle between land or sea forces including airborne forces).
(3) Installations, construction and other works of a military nature, such as
barracks, fortifications, War Ministries (e.g. Ministries of Army, Navy, Air
Force, National Defence, Supply) and other organs for the direction and
administration of military operations.
(4) Stores of arms or military supplies, such as munition dumps, stores of
equipment or fuel, vehicles parks.
(5) Airfields, rocket launching ramps and naval base installations.
(6) Those of the lines and means of communication (railway lines, roads,
bridges, tunnels and canals) which are of fundamental military importance.
(7) The installations of broadcasting and television stations; telephone and
telegraph exchanges of fundamental military importance.
(8) Industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the war:
(a) industries for the manufacture of armaments I
(b) industries for the manufacture of supplies and material of a military
character, such as transport and communications material, equipment for
the armed forces;
(c) factories or plant constituting other production and manufacturing centres
of fundamental importance for the conduct of war, such as the metallurgical,
engineering and chemical industries, whose nature or purpose is essentially
military;
(d) storage and transport installations whose basic function it is to serve the
industries referred to in (a)-(c);
(e) installations providing energy mainly for national defence, e.g. coal, other
fuels, or atomic energy, and plants producing gas or electricity mainly for
military, consumption.
(9) Installations constituting experimental, research centres for experiments
on and the development of weapons and war matenal."
G. Civilian and "Dual-Use" Objects
The ICRC's model compilation includes objects that have "dual-uses
or functions," that is, they serve the needs of the civilian population, but
houses, POL [petroleum, oil and lubricants] storage areas, docks, port facilities,
harbors, bridges, airfields, military vehicles, armor, artillery, ammunition stores, troop
concentrations and embarkation points, lines of communication and other objects
used to conduct or support military operations. Proper naval targets also include
geographic targets, such as a mountain pass, and buildings and facilities that provide
administrative and personnel support for military and naval operations such as
barracks, communications and command and control facilities, headquarters buildings,
mess halls, and training areas. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, ANNOTATED
SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NWP9 (REv A)/FMFM 1-10 1 8.1.1 (1989) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter NAVAL
MANUAL].
45. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 36, at 632 n.3.
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they also effectively contribute to the enemy's military action. These
objects typically include bridges, power plants, chenucal and other factories,
fuel storage depots, railroad and other transportation facilities and systems,
vehicles, and communications facilities. The Air Force Pamphlet openly
concedes that "controversy exists over whether, and the circumstances
under which, objects, such as civilian transportation and
communications systems, dams and dykes can be classified properly as
military objectives.''1
It is important to understand that, under customary law, civilian objects
enjoy general protection against direct attack. Article 52(1) defines civilian
objects in the negative; that is, as all objects that are not military
objectives, as defined in paragraph 2 of that same article which sets forth
the two-fold test for military objectives.47 Therefore, article 52 implicitly
characterizes all objects as civilian, unless they make an effective
contribution to the enemy's military action and unless destroying, capturing,
or neutralizing them offers a definite military advantage in the prevailing
circumstances.
In doubtful situations, article 52 creates a presumption that objects
normally dedicated to civilian use, such as churches, houses, or schools,
are not employed to contribute effectively to military action. This
presumption attaches only to objects that ordinarily have no significant
military use or purpose. This presumption, therefore, does not apply to
dual-use objects. The New Rules indicates that "the test as to such
objects-unaffected by presumptions on either side of the equation-
remains the two-pronged test [of military objectives] established in para.
2 [of article 52]." 48
VII. RESTRAINTS ON ATTACKS: PROHIBITION OF DISPROPORTIONATE AND
OTHER INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS
A. The Rule of Proportionality
The legitimacy of a military target under article 52 does not provide
unlimited license to attack it. The customary principles of military necessity
and humanity require that the attacking party always seek to avoid or
minimize civilian casualties and, thus, prohibit disproportionate and other
kinds of indiscriminate attacks.
Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(iii) contain the first codification of the
customary rule of proportionality as it relates to collateral civilian casualties
and damage to civilian objects. Article 51(5)(b) formulates this rule as
"[an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
46. Am FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 7 at 5-9, 5-3(b)(2). The Pamphlet does state
that given the heavy military purposes of sophisticated transportation systems in intense
conflicts, "their status as military objectives is readily apparent." Id. at 5-8, 1 5-3(a)(2).
47 Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 52(i).
48. NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 326.
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thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated. ' 49 This rule, according to the New Rules,
clearly requires those who plan or decide upon attack must take into account
the effects of the attack on the civilian population in their pre-attack estimate.
They must determine whether those effects are excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Obviously, this decision
will have to be based on a balancing of: (1) the foreseeable extent of
incidental or collateral civilian casualties or damage, and (2) the relative
importance of the military objective as a target.10
The U.S. government expressly recogmzes the rule of proportionality
as a general restraint on the conduct of hostilities. " Acceptance of this
customary law rule is also evidenced by its inclusion in the military
manuals of the three U.S. armed services. The Air Force Pamphlet
formulates the rule of proportionality as follows:
Attacks are not prohibited against military objectives even though incidental
injury or damage to civilians will occur, but such incidental injury to civilians
or damage to civilian objects must not be excessive when compared to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Careful balancing of
interests is required between the potential military advantage and the degree
of incidental injury or damage in order to preclude situations raising issues
of indiscriminate attacks violating general civilian protections. 2
B. Concrete and Direct Military Advantage
The New Rules notes that the rule of proportionality imposes "an
additional limitation on the discretion of combatants in deciding whether
49. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(5)(b).
50. Naw RuLEs, supra note 26, at 310.
51. See Matheson, supra note 5, at 426.
52. Am FORCE PAWMHIET, supra note 7 at 5-10, 5-3(c)(2)(b). The NAVAL MANUAL,
supra note 44, 8.1.2.1 states that:
[i]t is not unlawful to cause incidental injury or death to civilians, or collateral
damage to civilian objects, dunng an attack upon a legitimate military objective.
Incidental injury or collateral damage should not, however, be excessive in light of
the military advantage anticipated by the attack. Naval commanders must take all
practicable precautions, taking into account military and humanitarian considerations,
to keep civilian casualties and damage to the absolute minimum consistent with
mission accomplishment and the security of the force. In each instance, the commander
must determine whether incidental injuries and collateral damage would be excessive,
on the basis of an honest and reasonable estimate of the facts available to him.
Id.
The AmMy FrELD MANUAL echoes this concept:
loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. Those
who plan or decide upon an attack, therefore, must take all reasonable steps to insure
that those objectives may be attacked without probable losses in lives and damage
to property disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated.
ARMy FIELD MANUAL, supra note 43, at 27-10, 41.
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an object is a military objective under para. 2 of Art. 52."1 If an attack
is expected to cause incidental casualties or damage, the requirement of
an anticipated "definite" military advantage under article 52 is heightened
to the more restrictive standard of a "concrete and direct" military
advantage set forth in article 51(5)(b).
According to the New Rules:
"Concrete" means specific, not general; perceptible to the senses. Its meaning
is therefore roughly equivalent to the adjective "definite" used in the two-
pronged test prescribea by Art. 52(2). "Direct," on the other hand, means
"without intervening condition of agency " Taken together the two words
of limitation raise the standard set by Art. 52 in those situations where
civilians may be affected by the attack. A remote advantage to be gained at
some unknown time in the future would not be a proper consideration to
weigh against civilian losses.14
The ICRC Commentary provides a similar interpretation, stating: "The
expression 'concrete and direct' was intended to show that the advantage
concerned should be substantial and relatively close, and that advantages
which are hardly perceptible and those which would only appear in the
long term should be disregarded.""
While allowing a fairly broad margin of judgment, the ICRC
Commentary notes,
even in a general attack the advantage anticipated must be a military
advantage and it must be concrete and direct; there can be no question of
creating conditions conducive to surrender by means of attacks which inci-
dentally harm the civilian population. A military advantage can only consist
in ground gained and in annihilating or weakening the enemy armed forces.
In addition, it should be noted that the words "concrete and direct" impose
stricter conditions on the attacker than those implied by the criteria defining
military objectives in Article 52 56
The term "concrete and direct military advantage refers to the
advantage anticipated from the specific military operation of which the
attack is a part taken as a whole and not from isolated or particular parts
of that operation. '" 7
Although the three U.S. military manuals use identical terminology in
formulating their definitions of the rule of proportionality, the Defense
Department, in its July 1991 report to Congress on the conduct of the
Gulf War, described that rule in somewhat different-and less restrictive-
terms. "[The rule] prohibits military actions in which the negative effects
53. NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 360.
54. Id. at 365.
55. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 36, at 684.
56. Id. at 685.
57 NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 311 (footnote omitted).
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(such as collateral civilian casualties) clearly outweigh the military gain. '58
This particular statement of the rule of proportionality appears to
modify the customary-law formulation of that rule found in the U.S.
military manuals and codified in Geneva Protocol I. Under the Pentagon's
new version of the rule, collateral damage is not evaluated in relation to
the "concrete and direct military advantage anticipated," but in terms of
the "military gain." This considerably relaxed standard would unduly
ease the burden of commanders in their choice of targets.
This new formulation, if accepted as Pentagon policy, would amount
to a unilateral revision of a fundamental rule of the customary law of
armed conflict, long accepted by and binding on the Umted States. As
such, it would be in conflict with governing laws.
C. Excessive Collateral Damage
The other side of the proportionality equation is the requirement that
the foreseeable injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects not be
disproportionate, i.e., "excessive" to the expected "concrete and definite
military advantage."
Excessive damage is a relational concept, not quantifiable in terms of
a fixed number of civilians dead or injured, or houses destroyed. Such
damage need not be so great that it "shock the conscience" of the world.
Rather, its avoidance requires a good-faith balancing of disparate
probabilities-the foreseeability of collateral damage and the relative
importance of a particular military target. Thus, the destruction of a
village, including its 500 civilian inhabitants, in order to kill a single
enemy smper or destroy a machine gun position would be clearly excessive
because of the relatively low importance of the target. 9
The ICRC Commentary provides other examples of "excessive" damage:
(a) "the presence of a soldier on leave obviously cannot justify the
destruction of a village," yet (b) "if the destruction of a bridge is of
paramount importance for the occupation or non-occupation of a strategic
zone, it is understood that some houses may be hit, but not that a whole
urban area be leveled."' 6 "Of course, the disproportion between losses
and damages caused and the military advantages anticipated raises a
delicate problem; in some situations there will be no room for doubt,
while in other situations there may be reason for hesitation. In such
situations the interests of the civilian population should prevail. ,61
However, the ICRC Commentary makes it clear that there is never a
justification for excessive civilian casualties:
The idea has also been put forward that even if they are very high, civilian
losses and damages may be justified if the military advantage at stake is of
58. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF CON-
FLICT/AN INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS 12-2 (1991).
59. See Parks, Air War and the Law of War 32 A.F L. REv 168 (1990).
60. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 36, at 684.
61. Id. at 626.
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great importance. This idea is contrary to the fundamental rules of the
Protocol; in particular it conflicts with article 48 (Basic rule) and with
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present Article 51. The Protocol does not provide
any justification for attacks which cause extensive civilian losses and damages.
Incidental losses and damages should never be extensive.1
2
Ultimately, compliance with the rule of proportionality depends on the
subjective judgment of military commanders in specific situations.
Recognizing that decisions are taken in battle "under circumstances when
clinical certainty is impossible and when the adversary is striving to conceal
the true facts, to deceive and to confuse," 63 the New Rules states that
[tlhe standard for judging the actions of commanders and others responsible
for planning, deciding upon or executing attacks, must be based on a
reasonable and honest reaction to the facts and circumstances known to
them from information reasonably available to them at the time they take
their actions and not on the basis of hindsight. 64
In view of the subjective nature of such decisions, the New Rules
suggests that parties to the conflict "should curtail the limits within which
commanders of operating units exercise their discretion by issuing rules
of engagement tailored to the situation prevailing in the area of conflict
involved. "63
In this regard, the Defense Department's July 1991 report to Congress
contains a section on the rules of engagement for coalition forces, but it
is utterly silent as to the content of those rules. Since these rules of
engagement must be consistent with the law of armed conflict, an important
unanswered question remains as to what the rules for Operation Desert
Storm provided. Assuming that they are classified, is continued classification
still necessary given the successful conclusion of hostilities? It is also not
clear whether, in discussing the nature of the balance required under the
rule of proportionality, the July 1991 Pentagon report's use of the phrase
"clearly outweigh" in place of "excessive" -the term used in Geneva
Protocol I and the three U.S. military manuals-was meant to signal a
substantive change.
D Other Kinds of Indiscriminate Attacks
In addition to disproportionate attacks, article 51(4) and (5) define and
prohibit other kinds of "indiscriminate" attacks.66 Examples of such
62. Id.
63. NE w RULES, supra note 26, at 279.
64. Id. at 279-80.
65. Id. at 310-11.
66. Article 51(4) and (5) state:
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
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attacks are those that are not directed at specific military objectives or
those that employ a method or means of combat that a party cannot
direct at a specific military objective. Thus, the article prohibits parties
from indiscriminately attacking military objectives and civilians or civilian
objects.
Article 51(5)(a) characterizes an attack as indiscriminate when it treats
a number of clearly separate and distinct military objectives located in a
city, town, village, or other area containing a concentration of civilians
or civilian objects as a single military objective. 67 A ground assault on a
single military objective within that locale, on the other hand, would not
constitute an unlawful indiscriminate attack. An attack on an entire
populated area in order to destroy several military objectives that a party
could have attacked separately, however, would be indiscriminate under
this test. This provision, therefore, would prohibit the target area aerial
bombardment of densely populated civilian centers that occurred during
World War 11.68
Whether the prohibition in article 51(5)(a) is new law or merely a
reaffirmation of existing custom depends on how the term "clearly
separated" is construed. The United States and other delegations at the
diplomatic conference that elaborated the Protocol
expressed the understanding that the words "clearly separated" refers not
only to a separation of two or more military objectives that can be observed
or which are visually separated, but also includes the element of a significant
distance. Further, that distance must be at least such a distance that will
permit the individual military objectives to be attacked separately 69
b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed
at a specific military objective; or
c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot
be limited as required by this Protocol;
and consequently in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and
civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate:
a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single
military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives
located in a city town, village or other area containing a similar concentration
of civilians or civilian objects; and
b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art 51(4 & 5).
67 Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(5)(a).
68. NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 309. The NEw RULES indicates that, for this rule
to apply the "concentration" of civilians must actually be endangered by the attack:
"the rule would not be violated if the civilian population has evacuated the town or city
before the attack or if the entire locality is used for military purposes." Id. However
civilians remaining in the town or city would retain the benefits of the rule of propor-
tionality. Id.
69. Id.
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If construed in accordance with this understanding, the prohibition probably
reaffirms customary law
E. Precautionary Measures
Article 57 of Geneva Protocol I codifies pre-existing customary law
regarding precautions that an attacking party must observe to avoid and
minimize collateral civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects."' Not
only does the U.S. government regard this article as declaratory of existing
law, but the Air Force Pamphlet's list of required precautions is virtually
a verbatim transcription of article 57 The Air Force Pamphlet recites
these precautions as follows:
(a) In conducting military operations, constant care must be taken to spare
the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects.
(b) With respect to attacks, the following precautions must be taken:
70. See id. at 357-69. See also Matheson, supra note 5, at 426-27 Article 57 states:
1. In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the
civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.
2. With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are
neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special
protection but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph
2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this
Protocol to attack them;
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the
attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antici-
pated;
c) effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the
civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.
3. When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a
similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack
on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian
objects.
4. In the conduct of military operations at sea or in the air, each Party to the
conflict shall, in conformity with its rights and duties under the rules of inter-
national law applicable in armed conflict, take all reasonable precautions to avoid
losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects.
5. No provision of this article may be construed as authorizing any attacks against
the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects.
Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 57
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(i) Those who plan or decide upon an attack must:
(a) Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be
attacked.are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not
subject to special protection but are military objectives and
that it is permissible to attack them;
(b) Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event
to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
and damage to civilian objects; and
(c) Refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.
(ii) An attack must be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent
that the objective is not a military one, or that it is subject to
special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(iii) Effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may
affect the civilian population unless circumstances do not permit.
(c) When a choice is possible between several military objectives for ob-
taining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall
be that which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives
and to civilian objects. 7'
The Air Force Pamphlet notes that "precautionary measures are not a
substitute for the general immumty of the civilian population, but an
attempt to give effect to the immunity of civilians and the requirements
of military necessity "72 These measures in effect impose additional restraints
on attacks against legitimate military targets. Thus, the planners of a
particular attack must (1) initially verify that the object selected is a
lawful military objective; (2) avoid, or at least minimize, incidental civilian
casualties and damage and (3) ensure that such casualties and damages
are not disproportionate to the "direct and concrete" military advantage
anticipated; and (4) do everything feasible to verify that military objectives
are in fact being attacked and not civilians or civilian objects.
71. AlR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 7 at 5-9 to 5-10, 5(3)(c)(1).
72. Id. at 5-10, 5-3(c)(2). The Am FORCE PAMPHLET also notes:
Since states have not always separated military activities from civilian activities, a
geographical and functional mixture of combatants and civilians and military objectives
and civilian objects often results Dangers to civilian populations in a given
situation vary according to the military objective attacked, configuration of terrain,
type of weapons used, meteorological conditions, the presence of civilians at the scene
or in the immediate vicinity and a particular combatant's ability and mastery of
bombardment techniques as well as the level of the conflict and the type of resistance
to be encountered during the attack. Permissible bombardment techniques vary
according to such factors.
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F Verification of Military Objectives
Both article 57 and the Air Force Pamphlet adopt a "feasible"
precautions standard in connection with target verification and the rule
of proportionality The New Rules explains that the word "feasible"
means "that which is practicable or practically possible."" The United
States and its NATO allies at the Diplomatic Conference expressed the
understanding that that term means "that which is 'practicable or practically
possible' taking into account all the circumstances ruling at the time,
including those relevant to the success of military operations. ' 74
The New Rules indicates that the requirement that the planner do
"everything feasible" to verify that the target selected is a military
objective involves
a continuing obligation to assign a high priority to the collection, collation,
evaluation and dissemination of timely target intelligence. It must be ob-
served, however, that the adverse party will do its utmost to frustrate target
intelligence activity and may be expected to employ rules to conceal, deceive
and confuse reconnaissance means.7"
The Air Force Pamphlet states in this regard that "[s]ound target intelligence
also enhances military effectiveness by insuring that the risks undertaken
are militarily worthwhile. It is also a matter of conservation of vital
resources. Economy of force, concentration of effort and maximization
of military advantage support such efforts." 76
G. Collateral Casualties and Damage
The duty under article 57(2)(a)(ii) and the Air Force Pamphlet to "take
all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack to
avoid or minimize incidental civilian casualties and damage to civilian
objects is an injunction to promote the maximum feasible accuracy in the
conduct of bombardments of military objectives situated in populated
places." 77
The Air Force Pamphlet, while indicating that civilian casualties "are
to be avoided to the greatest extent possible," states that "international
law has long recognized that civilian casualties and damage to civilian
objects, although regrettable, do occur in armed conflict."78 The Air Force
Pamphlet notes that such incidental casualties result from several factors:
73. NEw RuLsS, supra note 26, at 362.
74. Id. See also Parks, supra note 59, at 156 (footnote omitted).
75. NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 363.
76. AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 7 at 5-10, 5-3(c)(2)(a).
77 NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 364. The term "means" of attack, combat or
warfare generally refers to the weapon deployed, while the term "methods" of attack,
etc. generally refers to the way in which such weapons are used. ICRC COMMENTARY,
supra note 36, at 621.
78. AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 7 at 5-10, 5-3(c)(2)(b).
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First, military objectives may not be segregated from civilian population
centers, civilians, or civilian objects. Second, civilians may be used for
military purposes, sometimes taking a direct part in hostilities and other
times being used unlawfully in an attempt to shield military objectives from
attack. Third, objects designed for civilian purposes may be used for military
purposes and become military objectives. Fourth, combatants themselves may
not fulfill their strict obligation to identify themselves as combatants and
thus create risks that what appear to be civilians are in fact combatants.
Fifth, care is not taken by combatants to avoid civilian casualties.79
It is important to note that the ICRC's draft of subparagraph 2(a)(ii)
which referred to collateral casualties and damage in the "immediate
vicinity" of military operations was deleted from the final text of article
57 80 The New Rules suggests that "[tihis action indicates a recogmtion
that it is not possible to regulate all of the infinite variables which may
affect military operations. It nevertheless imposes an affirmative duty to
do what is feasible to promote accuracy and to avoid, or minimize civilian
losses.'""l It admonishes that "[t]hese matters should be regulated in detail
by the rules of engagement and technical instructions issued by the
Parties."I"
H. The Rule of Proportionality
The Air Force Pamphlet and article 57(2)(a)(ii) both restate and codify
the rule of proportionality as a required precautionary measure. As
previously explained, this rule prohibits an attack if the foreseeable injury
or damage would be excessive or disproportionate compared with the
"concrete and direct" military advantage anticipated.
L Cancellation or Suspension of Attacks
Customary law and traditional military doctrines, codified in article
57(2)(b) of Geneva Protocol I and the Air Force Pamphlet, require the
cancellation or suspension of an attack if it becomes apparent that a
given target is not a military objective or that the attack will cause
excessive collateral casualties and damage in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated. The New Rules indicates that this
obligation is so phrased as to "apply to all commanders who have the
authority to cancel or suspend attacks, including those at higher echelons
who frequently have better intelligence sources than those actually engaged.
79. Id. I 5-3(c)(2)(b).
80. NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 364.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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But it also applies to the commander of military organizations actually
engaged in combat." 3
The authors of the New Rules make the following important point
concerning application of the rule of proportionality-
In a co-ordinated military operation, the relative importance of the military
objective under attack in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated is not a matter which can be determined by individual tank
leaders, the commanders of lower echelon combat units or individual at-
tacking bomber aircraft. If assigned a fire or bombing mission they must
assume that an appropriate assessment has been made by those who assigned
the mission. Thus, in this situation, the decision to cancel will have to be
made at the level where the decision to initiate the attack was made. Article
85(3) evidences recognition that responsibility for causing excessive loss of
civilian lives or injury or excessive damage to civilian objects rests on those
who know such consequences to be excessive.m
J Warning Requirement
Both article 57(2)(c) and the Air Force Pamphlet require the giving of
"effective advance warning" of attacks which may affect the civilian
population, unless circumstances do not permit. This requirement is based
on and reaffirms article 26 of the Hague Convention of 1907 which relates
to the Bombardment of Naval Forces. 5
The New Rules notes that, since the element of surprise is frequently
critical to air operations, "and as a warning serves to alert air defence
forces as well as to provide civilians an opportunity to take shelter, the
practice of States during and after World War II has been either to omit
warnings or to make them so general and unspecific as not to serve the
83. Id. at 366. The term "attacks" refers to acts of violence, whether offensive or
defensive. "The thrust of the term 'attacks' as used in Art. 57 deals with the fire aspect
of the operations, not necessarily the movement part." Id. While offensive operations
may be difficult to halt,
any commander even at the lowest echelon can and must halt fire on a target that
he has mistaken as a military objective when he realizes that his target consists of
civilians or specially protected objects. Halting fire at a target which does not pose
a threat against the attacking element in no way delays the movement of a unit of
the armed forces engaged in an offensive military operation. Thus the first clause of
subpara. 2(b) causes no problem to combatants who respect the rules applicable in
armed conflict.
Id.
84. Id. at 366-67
85. Art. 26 provides "if the military situation permits, the commander of the attacking
naval force, before commencing the bombardment, must do his utmost to warn the
authorities." Bombardment by Naval Forces, Oct. 18, 1907 art. 26, 36 Stat. 2351, T.S.
542. The NEw RULES indicates that subparagraph 2(c) of article 57 "relaxes the warning
requirement of Art. 26 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 which permits derogations only
in case of assault." NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 367
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intended purpose.'"'1 While the Air Force Pamphlet makes a similar
assertion,"' it does observe, however, that "[m]ore recently, increased
emphasis has been placed on the desirability and necessity of prior
warnings."8
K. Special Legal Protection
Although the provisions in Geneva Protocol I, in governing restraints
on attacks are more explicit than those in preexisting conventional and
customary law, these provisions, as Solf observes, "remain to a large
extent general principles which require subjective judgment in specific
situations.''89 He adds in this regard "[r]ecogmzing this subjectivity the
Diplomatic Conference developed the fourth approach to achieving
improved protection for the civilian population namely specific
provisions regulating attacks on particular objects and specific areas."' 9
L. Prohibition Against Starvation of the Civilian Population
By prohibiting starvation of the civilian population as a method of
warfare, article 54 establishes, in essence, a new rule which, while arguably
not yet customary law, has nonetheless been accepted as such by the U.S.
government. 91 This article provides:
1 Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as food-
stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, live-
stock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for
the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the
civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether
in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any
other motive.
3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the objects
covered by it as are used by an adverse Party-
a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or
86. NEW RuLEs, supra note 26, at 367 "This practice is supported by the negotiating
record of the Hague Regulations which suggests that the 'assault' exception includes all
cases where surprise is required." Id.
87 AiR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 6, at 5-11, 1 5-3(d). The Pamphlet states:
During World War II, practice was lax on warnings because of the heavily defended
nature of the targets attacked as well as because of attempts to conceal targets.
The practice of states recognizes that warnings need not always be given. General
warnings are more frequently given than specific warnings, less the attacking force
or the success of its mission be jeopardized.
Id.
88. Id.
89. Solf, supra note 8, at 132.
90. Id.
91. See Matheson, supra note 5, at 426.
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b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provided,
however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be taken
which may be expected to leave the civilian population with such
inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement.
4. These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals.
5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any party to the conflict in
the defense of its national territory against invasion, derogation from
the prohibitions contained in paragraph 2 may be made by a Party to
the conflict within such territory under its own control where required
by imperative military necessity 92
Paragraph I of the article prohibits starvation as a means of warfare,
"i.e., a weapon to annihilate or weaken the population." 9 The ICRC
Commentary states:
To use it as a method of warfare would be to provoke it deliberately, causing
the population to suffer hunger, particularly by depriving it of its sources
of food or of supplies. It is clear that activities conducted for this purpose
would be incompatible with the general principle of protecting the population,
which the Diplomatic Conference was concerned to confirm and reinforce.
94
It should be noted that this basic rule in paragraph 2 prohibiting
attacks, destruction, removal, or rendenng useless covered objects applies
only where such action is taken for the specific purpose of denying their
sustenance value to the civilian population of either party, or to a
combination of the enemy's forces and the civilian population, but not
for any collateral effect. The New Rules states in this regard:
This paragraph does not prohibit the incidental distress of civilians resulting
from otherwise lawful military operations. It would not, for example, be
unlawful to attack or destroy a railroad line simply because the railroad was
used to transport food needed to supply the population of a city, if the
railroad was otherwise a military objective under Art. 52. Such incidental
effects are regulated to some degree by Art. 57 and Arts. 68-71 dealing with
relief actions.9"
Paragraph 3 specifies the two situations in which the objects covered
lose their special protection from direct attack, destruction, or removal.
Subparagraph 3(a) permits supplies of foodstuffs intended for the sole
use of the enemy's armed forces to be attacked or destroyed. The New
Rules indicates that this exception generally applies "to supplies already
in the hands of the adverse Party's armed forces because it is only at
that point that one could know that they are intended for use only for
92. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 54.
93. ICRC COmmENTARY, supra note 36, at 653.
94. Id.
95. NE w RULES, supra note 26, at 339 (emphasis added).
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the members of the enemy's armed forces." However, it would not be
permissible to destroy objects "in the military supply system intended for
the sustenance of prisoners of war, the civilian population of occupied
territory or persons classified as civilians serving with, or accompanying
the armed forces. 97
The ICRC Commentary indicates that subparagraph (a) "is undoubtedly
concerned with foodstuffs and the agricultural areas producing them,
crops, livestock, and supplies of drinking water, but not with installations
for drinking water or irrigation works." 98 The ICRC Commentary notes,
however, that while "some supplies of foodstuffs or drinking water can
serve to sustain the armed forces, this possibility does not seem sufficient
reason for depriving such objects of protection 99
The second situation entailing loss of protection is detailed in
subparagraph (b). This exception permits attacks against objects when
used for a purpose other than the subsistence of the enemy's forces and
such use is "in direct support of military action." The New Rules state
that the term "direct support of military action" is narrower than the
term "effective contribution to military action" in article 52, "which
might include indirect support.'"1°
The ICRC Commentary states that this term refers to the following
kinds of military operations: "bombarding a food-producing area to
prevent the army from advancing through it, or attacking a food-storage
barn which is being used by the enemy for cover or as an arms depot
etc. ' 101 The New Rules suggests that "[tihis exception is an extremely
narrow one which is not likely to be invoked frequently because a Party
confronted with such a situation is most likely to consider his attack to
be for the purpose of defeating the direct support activity (and therefore
not prohibited under para. 2) rather than for the purpose of denying
sustenance value to the adverse Party "2
Even if action is taken against covered objects under this exception,
other provisions of paragraph 3(b) limit such action by prohibiting those
"which may be expected to leave the civilian population with such
inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its
movement." 103 The New Rules indicates, however, that "Art. 57 provides
the limitations on the effects of the attack, if the purpose of the attack
is to deny the adverse Party the direct support of military action afforded
96. Id. at 340.
97 Id. at 340-41.
98. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 36, at 656.
99. Id. at 656-57
100. NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 341.
101. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 36, at 657 The NEw RULES gives the following
examples of direct support: "an irrigation canal used as part of a defensive position, a
water tower used as an observation post, or a cornfield used as cover for the infiltration
of an attacking force." NEw RULEts, supra note 26, at 341.
102. NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 341.
103. Id.
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by the object (other than its sustenance value) and if the two pronged
test of Art. 52 [military objectives] is met."'14
Both the ICRC Commentary and the New Rules agree that the term
civilian population referred to in paragraph 2(b) does not refer to the
civilian population of the country as a whole, but rather to the population
of "an immediate area," although the size of the area was not defined
by the Diplomatic Conference. 0 s
VIII. SPECIAL PROTECTION TO OTHER OBJECTS AND AREAS
A. Protection of the Natural Environment
Articles 35(3)106 and 55'07 of Geneva Protocol I prohibit the use of
methods and means of warfare which are specifically intended or may be
expected to cause widespread, long term, and severe damage to the natural
environment and thereby prejudice the health and survival of the
population. 0
Although some humanitarian law scholars argue that this prohibition,
albeit new, is so basic that it must be construed as being inherent to a
general principle of law and thereby binding on all states as general
international law, 08 the U.S. government considers this prohibition to be
104. Id.
105. See id., ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 36, at 656 n.16.
106. Article 35(3) states: "It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage
to the natural environment." Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 35(3).
107 Article 55 provides:
i. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against wide
spread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of
the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected
to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the
health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.
Id. art. 55.
108. For a detailed discussion of these provisions, see NEw RULES, supra note 26, at
343-48. This treatise states that "[t]here may be a tendency to confuse the effects of Arts.
35 and 55 with the Convention on Environmental Modification which was concluded in
Geneva only ten days before the Plenary adopted Art. 55." Id. at 347 It notes in this
regard that:
The convention prohibits the military or other hostile use of environmental modifi-
cation techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects as a means of
destruction or other damage or injury to any other State. This prohibition is directed
at deliberate environmental modification, whereas those of Protocol I also include
objectively foreseeable collateral effects. Under the convention any one of the described
effects separately is prohibited, but under Protocol I they must be cumulative.
Id. (emphasis original). See also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 36, at 661-64.
109. See Solf, supra note 8, at 134. See also Cassese, The Geneva Protocols of 1977
on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and Customary International Law, 3 PAc.
B.L. REv 55, 93-94 (1984) (stating that it is possible to conclude that the first two
provisions of article 55 "were regarded by States (except possibly for France) as reflecting
general law " but the "paragraph on reprisals, by contrast, constitutes a bold innovation
and has only contractual force.").
[Vol. 23
LEGAL REGIME
"too broad and ambiguous" and not to be "a part of customary law "11o
B. Protection of Works and Facilities Containing Dangerous Forces
Article 56 provides special protection for dams, dikes, and nuclear
electric generating stations. It prohibits attacks on these works and
installations and on military objectives located in their vicinity if such
attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and, consequently, severe
losses among the civilian population."'
There are some limited exceptions to this protection such as when the
installation or military objective is used in regular and direct support of
military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate
such support. In the event these objects lose their special protection from
attack, the party launching such an attack would still be obliged to take
the necessary precautions to avoid and mmnimze collateral civilian casualties
as required by articles 51 and 57 of the Protocol. Solf cautions, however,
that "it would require an extraordinarily important target and a very
significant military advantage to outweigh the severe civilian losses which
might result from the dangerous forces released by the destruction of a
dam, dike, or nuclear power station.""12
Despite the fact that the U.S. military during the Vietnam conflict
generally refrained from attacks against dams and dikes, the U.S.
government does not "support" the provisions of article 56 and does not
"consider them to be customary law ""3 The Air Force Pamphlet does
state that if such objects are legitimate military targets under prevailing
circumstances,
[o]f course, their destruction must not cause excessive injury to civilians or
civilian objects [T]here are clearly special concerns that destruction of
such objects may unleash forces causing widespread havoc and injury far
beyond any military advantage secured or anticipated. Target selection of
such objects is accordingly a matter of national decision at appropriately
high policy levels."
4
C. Protection of Cultural Objects and Places of Worships
Article 53 prohibits acts of hostility against culturally important historic
monuments, places of worship, and works of art, and also forbids the
use of such objects to support the military effort."'
110. See Matheson, supra note 5, at 424.
111. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 56.
112. Solf, supra note 8, at 134. See also NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 348-57" ICRC
COMMENTARY, supra note 36, at 665-75.
113. Matheson, supra note 5, at 427
114. Am FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 7 at 5-11, 5-3(d).
115. Article 53 provides:
Without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of
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Customary international law, as reflected in article 27 of the Hague
Regulations of 1907, prohibits attacks on a variety of cultural and religious
objects provided they are not used at the time for military purposes, and
the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property of 1954
permits derogations even in the case of very important cultural objects in
the case of imperative military necessity 116 As article 53 is made subject
to these relevant conventions, it is not yet clear whether customary
international law is as broad as article 53 seems to be.
The Air Force Pamphlet states the following concerning these objects:
Buildings devoted to religion, art, or charitable purposes as well as historical
monuments may not be made the object of aerial bombardment. Protection
is based on their not being used for military purposes. Combatants have a
duty to indicate such places by distinctive and visible signs. When used by
the enemy for military purposes, such buildings may be attacked if they are,
under the circumstances, valid military objectives. Lawful military objectives
located near protected buildings are not immune from aerial attack by reason
of such location, but, insofar as possible, necessary precautions must be
taken to spare such protected buildings along with other civilian objects." 7
IX. PROHIBITIONS OF ATTACKS ON NON-DEFENDED LOCALITIES AND
DEMILITARIZED ZONES
As a basic clarification of the prohibition of attacks on undefended
places which are open to occupation without resistance, article 59 is
declaratory of customary international law Il
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, and of other
relevant international instruments, it is prohibited:
a) to commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic monuments, works
of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of
peoples;
b) to use such objects in support of the military effort;
c) to make such objects the object of reprisals.
Geneva Protocol 1, supra note 3, art. 53.
116. Article 27 of the Hague Regulations states:
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as
possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided
they are not being used at the time for military purposes.
It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by
distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand.
Hague Regulations, supra note 9, art. 27
The NEw RULES states that -[t]he obligation of the Hague Regulation to spare such
objects as much as possible implies the precautions against collateral damage which are
provided in Protocol I by Arts. 51(4) and (5) and in Arts. 57 and 58. Article 27 of the
Hague Regulations is considered to have passed into customary international law " NEw
RULES, supra note 26, at 329. See also ICRC COMMENTARY supra note 36, at 639-49.
117 AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 7 at 5-13, 5-5(c).
118. Article 59 provides:
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Article 60 merely provides for special protection, by agreement, for
certain demilitarized zones which are then not subject to attacks or any
other kind of military operation while the agreement remains in effect. 1 9
1. It is prohibited for the Parties to the conflict to attack, by any means whatsoever,
non-defended localities.
2. The appropriate authorities of a Party to the conflict may declare as a non-
defended locality any inhabited place near or in a zone where armed forces are
in contact which is open for occupation by an adverse Party Such a locality
shall fulfil the following conditions:
(a) all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment
must have been evacuated;
(b) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments;
(c) no acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the population;
and
(d) no activities in support of military operations shall be undertaken.
3. The presence, in this locality, of persons specially protected under the Conventions
and this Protocol, and of police forces retained for the sole purpose of maintaining
law and order, is not contrary to the conditions laid down in paragraph 2.
4. The declaration made under paragraph 2 shall be addressed to the adverse Party
and shall define and describe, as precisely as possible, the limits of the non-
defended locality. The Party to the conflict to which the declaration is addressed
shall acknowledge its receipt and shall treat the locality as a non-defended locality
unless the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 are not in fact fulfilled, in which
event it shall immediately so inform the Party making the declaration. Even if
the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 are not fulfilled, the locality shall
continue to enjoy the protection provided by the other provisions of this Protocol
and the other rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.
5. The Parties to the conflict may agree on the establishment of non-defended
localities even if such localities do not fulfil the conditions laid down in paragraph
2. The agreement should define and describe, as precisely as possible, the limits
of the non-defended locality; if necessary, it may lay down the methods of
supervision.
6. The Party which is in control of a locality governed by such an agreement shall
mark it, so far as possible, by such signs as may be agreed upon with the other
Party, which shall be displayed where they are clearly visible, especially on its
perimeter and limits and on highways.
7 A locality loses its status as a non-defended locality when it ceases to fulfil the
conditions laid down in paragraph 2 or in the agreement referred to in paragraph
5. In such an eventuality, the locality shall continue to enjoy the protection
provided by the other provisions of this Protocol and the other rules of inter-
national law applicable in armed conflict.
Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 59. For an analysis of this article, see ICRC
COMMENTARY, supra note 36, at 699-706; NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 375-85.
119. Article 60 states:
1. It is prohibited for the Parties to the conflict to extend their military operations
to zones on which they have conferred by agreement the status of demilitarized
zone, if such extension is contrary to the terms of this agreement.
2. The agreement shall be an express agreement, may be concluded verbally or in
writing, either directly or through a Protecting Power or any impartial humani-
tarian organization, and may consist of reciprocal and concordant declarations.
The agreement may be concluded in peacetime, as well as after the outbreak of
hostilities, and should define and describe, as precisely as possible, the limits of
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The U.S. government has expressed its support for these rules.2 0
A. Special Protection for Civilian Defense Shelters
Articles 62 to 65 of Geneva Protocol I create new rules applicable to
civilian civil defense personnel, activities, and objects. Paragraph 1 of
article 62 accords general protection against direct attacks to civilian civil
defense organizations and personnel.' Paragraph 3 provides, inter alia,
that "[b]uildings and material used for civil defense purposes and shelters
provided for the civilian population are covered by Art. 52 [Geneva
the demilitarized zone and, if necessary, lay down the methods of supervision.
3. The subject of such an agreement shall normally be any zone which fulfills the
following conditions:
(a) all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment,
must have been evacuated;
(b) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments;
(c) no acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the population;
and
(d) any activity linked to the military effort must have ceased.
The Parties to the conflict shall agree upon the interpretation to be given
to the condition laid down in sub-paragraph (d) and upon persons to be
admitted to the demilitarized zone other than those mentioned in paragraph
4.
4. The presence, in this zone, of persons specially protected under the Conventions
and this Protocol, and of police forces retained for the sole purpose of maintaining
law and order, is not contrary to the conditions laid down in paragraph 3.
5. The Party which is in control of such a zone shall mark it, so far as possible,
by such signs as may be agreed upon with the other Party, which shall be
displayed where they are clearly visible, especially on its perimeter and limits and
on highways.
6. If the fighting draws near to a demilitarized zone, and if the Parties to the
conflict have so agreed, none of them may use the zone for purposes related to
the conduct of military operations or unilaterally revoke its status.
7 If one of the Parties to the conflict commits a material breach of the provisions
of paragraphs 3 or 6, the other Party shall be released from its obligations under
the agreement conferring upon the zone the status of demilitarized zone. In such
an eventuality the zone loses its status but shall continue to enjoy the protection
provided by the other provisions of this Protocol and the other rules of inter-
national law applicable in armed conflict.
Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 60. For discussion of this article, see ICRC
COMMENTARY, supra note 36, at 707-12; NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 385-89.
120. See Matheson, supra note 5, at 427
121. Article 62 states:
1. Civilian civil defence organizations and their personnel shall be respected and
protected, subject to the provisions of this Protocol, particularly the provisions
of this Section. They shall be entitled to perform their civil defence tasks except
in case of imperative military necessity
2. The provisions of paragraph I shall also apply to civilians who, although not
members of civilian civil defence organizations, respond to an appeal from the
competent authorities and perform civil defence tasks under their control.
3. Buildings and materiel used for civil defence purposes and shelters provided for
the civilian population are covered by Article 52. Objects used for civil defence
purposes may not be destroyed or diverted from their proper use except by the
Party to which they belong.
Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 62.
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Protocol I]."122 While indicating that these facilities are protected to the
same extent as civilian objects, the New Rules notes:
A very difficult question in this connection is whether this reference to the
protection of civilian objects in general also includes a reference to the
definition in Art. 52, para. 2, which could mean that civil defence material
making an effective contribution to military action would not be considered
as a civilian object and thus not be considered as protected under Art. 52.
This is of particular importance for those civil defence functions which are
close to military efforts, such as warning and decontamination. The difficulty
is, however, perhaps more apparent than real. The question is whether
equipment used "to protect the civilian population" within the meaning of
the introductory phrase of Art. 61 could ever be considered as "making an
effective contribution to military action." The two purposes would be
considered as being mutually exclusive. Thus the situation would be similar
to that of medical units where their obvious utility for the military effort
does not result in a loss of protection. It is only when they are used "outside
their humanitarian function" to commit acts harmful to the enemy that they
lose their protection. The same holds true for civil defence personnel,
organizations and equipment used outside their "proper" task. Thus, civil
defence equipment used exclusively [for] the purposes mentioned in Art. 61
may never be considered as a military objective under Art. 52.123
The general protection from attacks enjoyed by civilian civil defense
personnel and objects ceases only if "they commit or are used to commit,
outside their proper tasks, acts harmful to the enemy "124 Paragraph 2 of
article 65 lists the following acts as not constituting acts "harmful to the
enemy-"'
(a) that civil defence tasks are carried out under the direction or control
of military authorities;
(b) that civilian civil defence personnel co-operate with military personnel
in the performance of civil defence tasks, or that some military personnel
are attached to civilian civil defence organizations;
(c) that the performance of civil defence tasks may incidentally benefit
military victims, particularly those who are hors de combat."
However, even in the event that these objects or personnel are used for
such hostile purposes, article 65 specifies that their protection against
attack ceases "only after a warning has been given setting, whenever
appropriate, a reasonable time limit, and after such warning has remained
unheeded." 1- 6 The U.S. government has declared its support for the
principle that civilian civil defense organizations and their personnel should
122. Id. art. 62, 1 3 (emphasis original).
123. NEw RULES, supra note 26, at 402.
124. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 65, 1.
125. Id. art. 65, 1 2.
126. Id. art. 65 (emphasis added).
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be respected and protected as part of the civilian population, but to date
has expressed no view on the grounds for cessation of such protection set
forth in article 65.127
X. CONCLUSION
Geneva Protocol I represents the first systematic codification and revision
of restraints on means and methods of warfare since 1907 Although this
instrument applies to all forms of armed conflict, its provisions were
particularly elaborated with the nature and effects of modern air warfare
and weaponry in mind.
Despite the Protocol's non-applicability to the Gulf conflict, many of
its detailed provisions reaffirm, strengthen and/or clarify pre-existing legal
restraints on attacks, and thus, as this article suggests, these provisions
should be regarded as customary international law binding on all states.
Accordingly, these provisions, together with relevant rules in the 1907
Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, constitute the basic
sources of law applicable to the conduct of Operation Desert Storm by
the allied coalition. Furthermore, the United States and its other coalition
partners that are not parties to the Protocol should observe those new
provisions in this instrument, absent their express rejection, which are
designed to strengthen the customary principle of civilian immunity in the
expectation that these provisions will become eventually part of the
customary law of armed conflict.
127 See Matheson, supra note 5, at 427
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